How did I come to research and write about Marine Corps women? It began several years ago. I had begun to look into history PhD programs, and was casting about for a dissertation topic. I was fascinated by the evolution of women’s roles in the Marine Corps. Why did the Marine Corps open opportunities to women? Was it a bottom-up approach, based on emergent requirements using good, old-fashioned Marine Corps innovation? Or was it a top-down approach, with Congress and the Defense Department dictating the opening of more positions?

Initially, I looked to the very recent past of Iraq and Afghanistan. This led me further back – where did it all begin? I was fascinated by the last forty years of the All Volunteer Force. So much had changed in such a short amount of time, and seemingly out of nowhere.

We saw the bottom-up approach in 2009 with the Female Engagement Team (FET) development. The idea for FETs evolved after an incident in which “some insurgents, trapped in a compound and surrounded by Marines, managed to escape by dressing in burkas and walking through the Marine cordon”. (According to an After Action Report from the 2^nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, p. 1)

The program represented a truly grassroots effort to increase mission effectiveness in the Helmand Province of Afghanistan. First Lieutenant Matt Pottinger drew on an asset the Marine Corps already possessed – women – as a battlefield advantage. Over the next few years, the program gained credibility, expanded and was adopted by the other services (as seen in the Army’s Cultural Support Teams).

Unfortunately, this program offers the rare example of a bottom-up approach. Usually, the Marine Corps (like the other services) has refused to open more opportunities to women until directed to do so by either the Secretary of Defense (through policy) or Congress (through legislation).

As I explored the history, I became fascinated with the battles that took place over women. Such small numbers of women (ranging from less than 2% of the force in 1973 to only 8% or so today) have resulted in astounding levels of time, money and effort in research, studies, reports, policy development and leadership attention. They have also forced dramatic, unprecedented cultural change in arguably the most strongly hyper-masculine organization in the world. The single other issue that would drive this much time and attention – in any of the services – was racial integration.

And like racial integration, the issues were similar. Things were working just fine, why change it? Integration (of minorities, women) threatened Marine Corps combat effectiveness. This phrase, “combat effectiveness”, would be used in every single argument – whether from inside or outside the Marine Corps – across five decades. The arguments were that women could not emotionally or mentally handle the rigors of combat, that they were not physically strong enough, or that they would negatively impact cohesion and morale.

It was never about the capabilities of the women. When women did succeed, they were called “exceptional”. Or, senior leaders simply sang their praises without admitting their previous doubts.

I very badly wanted to understand what was going on. I did not believe the Marine Corps inherently disliked women. I had been a Marine officer for too many years, and had loved my time in the Marine Corps too much, to believe that.

Only time and effort would reveal the complexities involved in the integration of women, and how much a single gender could threaten the core identity of an entire institution. Only time and effort would demonstrate that it was all about how we think about ourselves, and how we think about others. I would also find that amidst the anger and angst, the integration of women laid the path for some of the greatest improvements in Marine Corps standards and training. No story is one-sided, and this one is no different.