How did it all begin? What was the impetus for integrating women into the infantry?

Well, gender integration tends to follow a regular pattern:

1. War/Combat operations – Increased manpower needs usher in a new era of women’s participation;
2. They perform well;
3. Congress and/or the Defense Department consider making temporary changes permanent;
4. The military services pushback;
5. Congress and/or the Defense Department insist, then mandate;
6. Women walk through newly opened doors;
7. Over a generation of cultural change, what was once unthinkable becomes commonplace.

Of course, there are significant details missing from that very short synopsis. I have studied previous gender integrations in detail. I was fascinated to discover the background to this most recent period.

1. War/Combat operations: Iraq and Afghanistan set the stage. Women were everywhere. From the first Marines to land in Afghanistan (in 2001) to the convoy commanders leading resupply across Iraq and Afghanistan, women were an integral part of every aspect of these conflicts. Their sheer numbers necessitated their involvement in a way they never had before. By 2001, women were integrated into so many parts of the military that the U.S. literally could not deploy without them.

2. They performed well: In these conflicts, women were needed because they were women, not simply because the military needed more people. Their gender put them in a unique position to support operations. They acted as Lionesses in Iraq, searching female Iraqis at checkpoints around the country (as men were not allowed to search women). Sometimes, they had to travel to and from the checkpoint each day, as a 1994 policy restricted them from “co-locating” with all-male units.

In Afghanistan, they served in Female Engagement Teams (FETs). They interacted with Afghan women (as no men other than family members were allowed to interact with the women). They patrolled with the infantry on these missions, often coming in harm’s way when their small units were attacked. They were not allowed to be in the infantry. The same 1994 policy restricted them from entering any “ground combat” specialties (infantry, artillery, tanks, special forces, etc.).

3. Congress and/or the Defense Department consider making temporary changes permanent: The military had gotten around the 1994 policy through a variety of methods. They trucked women back to base at night. They “attached” them to infantry units so that they were not formally “assigned”. But one couldn’t help but notice that women seem to be everywhere that the men were. Some began to question why there were still restrictions on women’s participation.

Many assumed that it all began with a lawsuit. In November 2012, four plaintiffs claimed discrimination on the basis of sex in Hegar et al. v. Panetta (who was Secretary of Defense at the time):

Plaintiffs challenged as unconstitutional the official policy

that categorically excluded them, and all women, from

assignments to units whose primary mission is to engage

in direct ground combat. Plaintiffs alleged that the policy

was based on outdated stereotypes of women, ignored the

realities of the modern military and battlefield conditions –

under which women already were fighting, and dying, in

active combat – and barred women’s advancement to

senior military roles.

Hegar, et al. v. Panetta
The Legal Challenge to the Combat Exclusion Policy¹

Two of the women were Marines; all four claimed that they had operated in ground combat (in Iraq or Afghanistan) and that the Defense Department policy excluding women was unconstitutional. Then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta did rescind the 1994 policy, just two months after the plaintiffs filed the lawsuit.²

He opened all specialties to women – with two conditions. First, the services must develop “validated, gender-neutral occupational (physical) standards” and notify Congress. Second, exceptions might be granted. But any exception must be “based on rigorous analysis of factual data regarding the knowledge, skills and abilities for the position”.³ (This opened the door for all research that would take place through 2013-2015) The memo further stated that integration must occur by January 1st, 2016. So the clock was ticking.

But that was 2013. The annual Defense budget⁴ reflected Congressional mandates to review gender policies all the way back in 2009. What prompted this earlier focus? I was surprised at the source.

In the fall of 2007, several members of Congressional Black Caucus met with senior military leaders. The topic of discussion? Minority representation among general and flag officers, along with leadership opportunities for minorities at senior ranks. Despite decades of integration, and relative success with minority advancement in the enlisted ranks, the most senior officers continued to be predominantly white and male. Why?

“The truest melting pot in our society exists aboard aircraft carriers, in barracks and on bases . . . But in the officers’ clubs, a much different picture emerges. The diversity reflected within the enlisted ranks is lacking within the senior officer corps.”

Congressman Kendrick B. Meek (D-FL)⁵

The discussions continued through the fall of 2008, when Congress approved the annual defense budget. Congress established the Military Leadership Diversity Commission to investigate opportunities (and associated barriers) to inclusion, recruitment, promotion and retention of the country’s minorities.

These preliminary discussions would shape the course of history. For of course, “minorities” included women.

In its final report, the Commission offered 20 recommendations. They recommended research to understand why minorities (of all races and gender) entered the military, stayed in the military, were promoted and why they left the military (and when).⁷ For women specifically, the picture that emerged showed women leaving earlier and more often than men (a challenge of retention – not recruitment or promotion) and of women not gaining access to some of the highest ranks because those ranks were operational in nature.

In other words, the combat arms specialties – infantry, pilots and ship-drivers (surface ships or submarines) – were those most often selected to general officer or flag level. This severely restricted women’s opportunity to rise to the highest ranks of each service. Women could serve as pilots, so could conceivably reach flag rank there. However, it had only been about 15 years since combat aviation opened to women. Those first pilots (if they were still in the military) needed more time to reach flag rank.

One example is Alison Thompson. She graduated from the Naval Academy in 1994 to become a Marine Corps helicopter pilot. After successful tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, to include battalion level command, she is currently a colonel.

Women could also drive surface ships. Michelle Howard followed this trajectory to become the first woman to command a US Navy ship and the first African-American woman to reach four star rank.

However, women could not be infantry officers, nor artillery officers, nor tank officers or special operations officers. Ground combat operations continue to be the path most often trod to general officer rank in the Marine Corps. Every Commandant, with two exceptions⁷, have been infantry officers. With the doors to ground combat still closed to women, the Commission recommended the following to Congress:

DoD and the Services must remove institutional barriers in order to open traditionally closed doors, especially those relating to assignments . . . An important step in this direction is that DoD and the Services eliminate combat exclusion policies for women, including removing barriers and inconsistencies, to create a level playing field for all service members who meet the qualifications.

Final Report of the Military Leadership Diversity Commission, p. xvii⁸

In the 2011 defense bill, Congress accepted this recommendation, and mandated that a review of “laws, policies, and regulations, including the collocation policy, that may restrict the service of female members . . . to ensure that female members have an equitable opportunity to compete and excel in the Armed Forces.”⁹

The Secretary of Defense reported on the research results to Congress in February 2012. The November 2012 lawsuit added momentum to the wheels already in motion. Step 4: The military services push back was next up. The Marine Corps would spend more than two years, countless hours and tens of millions dollars on a research effort that would span three Commandants. The whirlwind was about to begin.

REFERENCES:

¹Hegar, et al. v. Panetta: The Legal Challenge to the Combat Exclusion Policy, American Civil Liberties Union, November 2012.

²Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule (DGCAR), Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), 13 January 1994. This policy restricted women from any direct ground combat. It also defined ground combat for the Defense Department. While Congress defined naval and air combat in legislation, it deferred to the Defense Department to define ground combat. This would become a point of contention over decades of warfare, constantly evolving to reflect no “rear area” or “frontline”.

³Elimination of 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule: Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Acting Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Chiefs of Military Service, 24 January 2013.

⁴The annual Defense budget (also known as the National Defense Authorization Act or NDAA) is the method with which Congress authorizes funds for the military services to operate. It is also (often) the method with which Congress uses to mandate reviews, studies, reports and changes to the military.

⁵“How Did the Military Leadership Diversity Commission Come About?“, Issue Paper #9, Implementation and Accountability, Military Leadership Diversity Commission, January 2010

⁷General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr. (24th Commandant) was an artillery officer. General James F. Amos (35th Commandant) was a pilot.

⁸“From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st Century Military“, Final Report of the Military Leadership Diversity Commission, March 2011.

⁹Public Law 111-383 Section 535 (NDAA 2011)