On a blustery day in November 2014, the Marine Corps got its first glimpse into how it was going with women in ground combat units. Surprises abounded, not all of them welcome.

It began nearly three years earlier. If you remember from How It All Began, the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC) had recommended the removal of all “institutional barriers” to women. In the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress took this recommendation and directed,

the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretaries of the military departments, shall conduct a review of laws, policies and regulations, including the collocation policy, that may restrict the service of female members in the Armed Forces to determine whether changes in such laws, policies or regulations are needed to ensure that female members have an equitable opportunity to compete and excel in the Armed Forces.

Section 535 of the Fiscal Year 2011 NDAA¹

In its review, the services found that the only policy really excluding women was the original 1994 Defense Memo. This restricted women from serving in “units below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground”, which included “locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver or shock effect”.² Seems pretty straightforward, right? Ground combat = infantry. Right?

Well . . . it’s a bit more complicated. Something apparently simple actually constituted three distinct categories:

• Physically demanding ground combat specialties
• Non-physically demanding ground combat specialties
• Assignment of non-ground combat specialties to ground combat units

The first category includes what you and I commonly think of as “ground combat” – infantry, artillery, tanks, special forces. The second category includes specialties (tank mechanics, for example) that directly support ground combat specialties. The third category includes all those supporting ground combat units.

You see, every ground combat unit needs logistics, communication, administrative, supply support. These are non-ground combat specialties. Under the 1994 memo’s collocation restriction, women in these types of specialties had not been assigned to any ground combat units. Women were not even assigned to a ground combat unit.³

In December 2011, the Marine Corps requested an exception to this policy. In conjunction with the Army, the Marine Corps intended to run a pilot program, assigning women (in non-ground combat specialties) to specific ground combat units.

Women would not be assigned to infantry or special forces units. They would be assigned to tank units, artillery units, combat engineer units, etc. The Marine Corps stated that they were “lower risk than infantry and reconnaissance units . . . due to the inherently mobile capability of these units”.⁴ The pilot program began only with senior enlisted women and officers. It would be two more years before the Marine Corps assigned junior non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and eventually, junior enlisted women to these units.

So, what happened?

Let’s go back to that day in November 2014.

The Marine Corps had commissioned a study to see how well that pilot program went. The team interviewed 31 Marines – eleven female Marines, ten male Marines and ten command leaders (commanding officers/sergeants major). The researchers asked participants what “successful gender integration” looked like; they asked about the positive and negative effects of gender integration; they asked about sexual harassment and assault; and they asked if the Marine planned to stay in the Marine Corps (post-gender integration). Despite the relatively small sample size, Marines in the study represented a variety of units – artillery battalions, tank battalions, a combat engineer battalion, a low altitude air defense battalion and an assault amphibious vehicle battalion.⁵

The most interesting details came from the direct quotes in the appendices. It was abundantly clear that “successful integration” meant full integration – women not serving as “quota fillers” but as capable, equal team members in every respect.

No one was surprised to hear a Marine state, “I don’t agree with the integration and I don’t think women should be in the infantry”. No one was surprised to hear that some men might resent women for becoming pregnant (and presumably placing additional burden on the remaining Marines), or that female spouses (of the male Marines) might not like female Marines working with their husbands. There were concerns about hygiene in the field, different physical standards for men and women, the need for separate living spaces.⁶

It was disturbing to hear how often women had been separated from male Marines while in the field, or that one female Marine was removed from a deployment list and replaced with a male Marine. Another said she was “separated from my Marines on deployment – never in 18 years was I separated from them before – I should be with my Marines”.⁷

When queried as to the benefits of gender integration, one Marine said, “there aren’t any”.⁸

It was humorous to hear how commanders assumed that these women were the “cream of the crop”. Little did they know the Marine Corps had followed its normal assignment process. There was no special screening process for these first women. It would not be the last time ground combat commanders expressed surprise at the quality of (many) female Marines. ⁹

The next comments brought silence to the briefing room.

One senior enlisted leader was told, “you won’t be here long” and spoke of Marines who “left notes on my car at work”. She was afraid and did not know how to handle the situation. Another female Marine spoke of returning from a deployment to find her command photo posted on Facebook with derogatory comments.¹⁰

When asked if they would choose to remain in an integrated unit, the women said, “No – the stress is too high and accumulated because of the stigma of being a female Marine – I used to be motivated, happier, energetic – since I was injured – constant scrutiny (everybody has their eyes on me)”. Another female said, “No – after my experiences”. Yet another stated that “the males need exposure (to women) before we even get there, much earlier in and throughout their careers”.¹¹

There were some positive experiences. One woman said she, “felt supported, the males took the initiative to even make me a sign for the bathroom”. Another said, “we became like family and they were supportive”.¹²

These women were senior enlisted and officers – in non-ground combat specialties – women mature and intelligent, with the most years of experience, the most rank, and therefore most capable of defending themselves. And they were not even in the infantry battalions. What would happen with more junior, inexperienced women? What would happen once (if) the infantry battalions were integrated? We all understood the implications.

So, what did we do?

One question that (then) Brigadier General George Smith, Jr. asked, “did the commanders know these things were happening in their units?”. The answer was “no”. The women had not reported any of these incidents to their chain of command.

He said, “Commanders need to know these things are going on.”

The easiest way to do this? Get on the Commander’s Course schedule to brief the study.

The Marine Corps takes a few things very seriously. One of them is battalion-level (and regimental-level) command. Leading a battalion-sized (or regimental-sized) unit is a major endeavor. Those two years of command may be some of the most intense of an officer’s career. Lieutenant colonels and colonels may be responsible for anywhere from 800 or so to a few thousand Marines, and they are responsible for the leadership climate in their units. They have the ability (and responsibility) to set the tone fro what is, and what is not, acceptable. This is the reason for Commander’s Course – to prepare commanders (and their spouses). A two-week program, the Commander’s Course is a mandatory event. The purpose,

To inform commanders, sergeants major and their spouses of the programs and practices that contribute to a successful command tour, as well as receive information briefs from senior Marine Corps leaders about the current direction of the Marine Corps.

Commandant’s Commandership Course Marine Administrative Message¹³

The schedule is packed tight, to ensure commanders get as much as possible out of those two weeks. Getting added to that schedule is no mean feat. But it was the most efficient method to communicate with commanders.

What else did we do? Nothing – at the time. But that study remained with us for the next year. As more studies came in, we heard of similar challenges. We learned that leadership must be proactive, anticipating challenges and addressing them with their male Marines early and often. We saw this work successfully in several places. (to be discussed in future posts) And we incorporated many of these lessons into the policy that fully integrated women into the ground combat arms – including the infantry. It really is all about leadership, and the climate leadership sets.

REFERENCES

¹H.R. 6523: Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, PUBLIC LAW 111–383, 7 January 2011.

²Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule (DGCAR), Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), 13 January 1994. This memo defined ground combat: “Direct ground combat is engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew-served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force’s personnel. Direct ground combat takes place well forward on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver or shock effect”.

³This proved challenging during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lionesses and FETs could not be “assigned” to ground combat units, so the Marine Corps (and Army) had to get creative in how they enabled women to support ground combat units. They “attached” women to these units instead, or would send them out for the day and return them to a forward operating base (FOB) at night. It may seem like semantics (it was), but it was a real restriction on women’s participation.

⁴“Marine Corps Review of FY11 NDAA Report to Congress and Proposed Implementation Plan Regarding Exception to Policy Allowing Temporary Assignment of Females to Select Ground Combat Units Under the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, January 13, 1994”; Headquarters, Marine Corps (Director for Manpower Plans and Policy), 9 Dec 2011.

⁵“Marine Corps Force Integration Plan Study Line of Effort 1: Thematic Study”, Beth-ann Vealey, Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy, Headquarters Marine Corps (Operations Analysis Division), 6 Nov 2014.

⁶Ibid, p. E-2-4.

⁷Ibid, p. E-4.

⁸Ibid, p. E-2.

⁹Ibid, p. F-7

¹⁰Ibid, p. E-6-7.

¹¹Ibid, p. E-7.

¹²Ibid, p. E-4.

¹³“Fiscal Year 2022 Cornerstone: The Commandant’s Combined Commandership Course”, Marine Administrative Message 403/21, 3 Aug 2021.